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INTRODUCTION

In a larger study of oral argument in the Supreme Court,' we
found in our sample of cases some decided per curiam, that is, by
unsigned disposition, after argument. That led us to explore the
* The research on which this article is based is supported by a grant from
the U.S. National Science Foundation (SES-8900171), "The Role of Oral Argument
in Supreme Court Decision Making."
The senior author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Susan Daly in
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Marcus, and, for substantial assistance in manuscript preparation, Rosanne Rowe,
U.S. Naval Academy, and Addie Napolitano, SUNY-Albany.
** A.B., 1959, Antioch College; M.A., 1961, Ph.D., 1962, University of
Oregon. Professor of Political Science, State University of New York at Albany.
B.A., 1969, Bradley University; Ph.D., 1974, State University of New York
at Albany. Professor of Political Science, Alfred University.
t B.A., 1970, Michigan State University; M.A., 1973, Ph.D., 1975, University
of Hawaii at Manoa. Professor of Political Science, Northern Illinois University.
tt A.B., 1940, Ph.D., 1948, Syracuse University. Professor of Political Science, University of Hawaii at Manoa. Research Professor, Southern Illinois University
at Carbondale.
1. See, e.g., James N. Schubert et al., Observing Supreme Court Oral Argument: A Bio-social Approach, 11 PouTIcs & LIrE SCIENCEs 35 (1992); Steven A.
Peterson et al., Oral Argument & Supreme Court Opinions (paper presented at
Northeastern Political Science Association meeting, Philadelphia, 1991); Steven A.
Peterson et al., Patterns of Oral Argument & Prediction of Case Outcomes (paper
presented at the American Political Science Association meeting, Washington, DC
1991).
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functions and nature of per curiam dispositions.2 In this article, we
examine the Court's use of per curiam decisions after full oral
argument instead of opinions signed by one of the justices; other per
curiams are examined here only to provide a larger picture of the
Court's use of such dispositions. Our focus is primarily on the 1969
through 1981 Terms, but examples will also be drawn from both
earlier race relations cases and from more recent terms of Court.
In our study, a random sample of 318 cases - stratified to
provide equal representation of cases addressing issues of criminal
procedure and all other issues - was drawn from the set of 1822
cases with oral argument resulting in signed opinions (1647), equally
divided votes (24) or per curiam dispositions (151) during the 1969
through 1981 Terms. The Supreme Court Judicial Data Base developed by Harold Spaeth was our principal source of cases. The higher
than anticipated number of per curiams led us to devote attention to
them.
Most cases accepted for review by the Supreme Court proceed to
plenary consideration - full briefing, oral argument, and a full
opinion signed by the author. However, there are instances when,
after full briefing and oral argument, the Court decides not to reach
the merits and disposes of the case by sending it back to the lower
courts for further consideration - for example, on the basis of a
recently-enacted statute or new lower court ruling - or dismisses the
certiorari petition as improvidently granted. These are one major type
of per curiam rulings. When there is plenary treatment, that is, full
briefing and oral argument, the likelihood is that the Court will issue
a signed opinion, so nonmerits dispositions occur only in a small
proportion of argued cases, but per curiam opinions are also used
when the Court decides a case based only on the certiorari papers,
without full briefing or oral argument.
In the stratified random sample of oral argument cases, 14 were
per curiams. Because an oral argument transcript was not available
for one, the number of usable per curiams was 13. Transcripts
obtained from the National Archives for the 13 per curiams in which
oral argument had been held were coded, using the OA tapes, to
show which justice had asked which questions.' Of the 13 cases, the
2. On this, see Stephen L. Wasby et al., The Per Curiam Opinion: Its Nature
& Functions, 76 JUDICATURE 29 (1992), and Stephen L. Wasby, et al., The Supreme

Court's Use of Per Curiam Dispositions (paper presented at Midwest Political Science

Association meeting, Chicago 1991).

3. Oral argument transcripts do not identify the justice asking a question, so
our identifications are based on voice recognition; although intercoder reliability is
quite high, voice recognition implies the possibility of error.
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Court reached the merits in four, so that there are 9 where briefing
and oral argument lead to a nonmerits disposition. It is intensive
qualitative examination of these nine which can help us untangle the
relationship between oral argument and nonmerits dispositions, and
it is thus those cases which receive our greatest attention. (A list of
the cases is presented in Appendix A.) Because the sample of cases
has been drawn properly, we can treat these cases as representative
of all the Court's per curiam dispositions, but in addition we draw
on other per curiams, using the United States Reports although we
did not obtain transcripts for those other cases.
After an examination of the frequency of per curiams (p.c.'s)
and a general discussion of the relation between per curiams and oral
argument, that link is illustrated; difficulties in inferring the linkage
between oral argument transcript and the Court's opinions are discussed. We then turn to two practical aspects of our study: (1) the
implications for the Rule of Four (on granting of certiorari) of the
Court's use of nonmerits dispositions after argument, and (2) what
the cases studied tell us about when the Court obtains information
relevant to - indeed, perhaps determinative of - a disposition
without reaching the merits.
I.

FREQUENCY

Over the last more than twenty years, there has been a downward
trend in the Court's use of per curiam dispositions, both after oral
argument and for cases decided without argument. (See Table 1.)
In O.T. 1969, the first year of our study, there were 47 per curiam
4
dispositions - 19 after oral argument and 28 without argument. By
the late 1980s, there were one-fourth that number per term. For
example, in O.T. 1986, there were 7 p.c.'s after oral argument and 6
without argument, a total of 13, and in the 1989 and 1990 Terms,
there were no per curiam opinions after oral argument, although there
were still some issued without briefing and argument. Thus almost all
of the decrease occurred before most of the remainder of the Court's
mandatory jurisdiction was eliminated, so jurisdictional change does
not explain the decline. The downward march in the frequency of per
curiam dispositions is far from completely linear. There is variation
4. We exclude per curiams when the notation is used for cases affirmed by
an equally divided Court, because there is no opinion written, preventing the linkage
of oral argument and result, and p.c.'s used in original jurisdiction cases, because
they are used for decrees, e.g., indicating state boundaries, not for rulings on matters
of law.
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from term to term in total numbers, with a greater variation in per
curiams decided without oral argument (NOA) than in those after oral
argument (OA), in part because there are more NOA than OA p.c.'s.
Table 1. Frequency of per curiams
AO p.c.
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971

NOA p.c.

OA p.c.

NOA p.c.

1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
II.

PROCEDURE AND SUBSTANCE

In some per curiams, the Court, not reaching the merits, adopts
procedural dispositions; for example, the Court vacates and remands
for consideration of an intervening statute or court decision. Such a
mandate may carry the implicit message, "We consider this statute
[or case] to be relevant," but the Supreme Court leaves it to the lower
court to take the next action on the merits. Another procedural
disposition is dismissal of certiorari as improvidently granted (DIG).
Although one can interpret certiorari denials as something of an
implicit approval - or at least a nondisapproval - of the lower
court's ruling, the Court's official position remains that denial of
certiorari - and dismissal of certiorari already granted - means only
that the Court in its discretion chose not to hear that case.
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In addition to such procedural outcomes, there are also per
curiams in which the Court makes substantive law. This is most
obvious when the Court hands down a ruling that looks every bit like
a signed opinion except for the p.c. label, or reaches the merits
without argument. These include rulings on the substance of procedural law. For example, the Court might turn away a case as moot,
but in so doing the per curiam ruling explicates the doctrine of
mootness. Or, in turning away an appeal for lack of a final judgment,
a per curian explanation might elaborate the requirements for a final
judgment from which an appeal could properly be taken. These rulings
certainly deal with procedural matters, but they add to the substance
of the law of procedure in a way a simply DIG or GVR (grant, vacate
and remand) disposition does not. Put another way, not only those
cases reaching the merits have substantive content, just as is true of
signed opinions decided on grounds of standing or mootness. Because
these per curiams have substantive content, that is, because they
explicate the law, we consider them "substantive" rather than "procedural," whatever the mandate accompanying them.
Per curiams decided after oral argument are more likely to be
procedural dispositions than substantive rulings; almost 60 percent of
the OA p.c.'s for the 1969-1981 Terms were procedural. On the other
hand, per curiams decided without argument are likely to contain
substantive law. Over three-fourths of per curiams announcing substantive law were handed down without argument, while three-fourths
of per curiams with procedural dispositions came after argument.
Per curiams coming after oral argument varied in content from
term to term; at times over half were procedural, while at other times
they were roughly evenly divided between those with procedural
dispositions and those with substantive content.
III.

PER CURIAMS AND ORAL ARGUMENT

We now turn to our examination of cases where oral argument
led the Court to nonmerits dispositions. As increased caseload has led
to reduction in the time allotted by the Supreme Court to each side
for oral argument, and as the U.S. courts of appeals have eliminated
it in many cases, the importance of oral argument has been debated
frequently. 5 Some feel oral argument is extremely valuable, allowing
5. For some discussions of oral argument, see Stephen L. Wasby et al., The

Functions of Oral Argument in the U.S. Supreme Court, 62 Q.J. SPEECH 410 (1976);
Stephen L. Wasby, Oral Argument in the Ninth Circuit: A View from the Bench &
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the Court to better understand cases it does decide. But more than
oral argument per se, the preparation for it may be crucial for judges
on a collegial court. Through that preparation, they focus their
attention on the case at hand at roughly the same time, which
facilitates effective intra-court discussion. Others see the time allotted
to oral argument as better allocated to other purposes, such as handing
down rulings in an increased number of cases or devoting more time
to better crafting of those rulings the Court does hand down. The
resources supposedly saved by dispensing with oral argument are,
however, not saved if per curiam dispositions without oral argument
provoke some justices to write concurring and dissenting opinions. 6
Oral argument may contribute to the process by which the Court
clarifies issues and facts and may help prevent decisions based on the
justices' mistaken views of them. Oral argument, either alone or in
connection with the briefs and the case record, certainly may reveal
that the posture of a case is different from what the justices anticipated
from the certiorari papers. The more complete view provided by
briefing and argument may lead to a decision that further lower court
action is necessary before the Supreme Court should consider the
case, or that the issue for which review was granted is not properly
presented. If the Court then dismisses the grant of review in the case
or returns the case to the lower court for further action before the
justices will reach the merits, it is engaging in an exercise of judicial
restraint in not reaching issues before it seems imperative to do so.
Per curiam dispositions thus become a helpful mechanism for
weeding out cases that look appealing to the justices at the reviewgranting stage but which, on more complete examination, no longer
appear to be proper for deciding the issues thought central to the
cases. For example, after granting certiorari in Iowa Beef Packers v.
Thompson7 to determine whether Fair Labor Standards Act cases
could be brought when the alleged FLSA violation was also subject
to a collective bargaining grievance, "It developed at oral argument
... that the grievance and arbitration provisions.., do not have the

Bar, 11 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 211 (1981); Stephen L. Wasby, The Functions &
Importance of Oral Argument: Some Views of Lawyers & Federal Judges, 65

340 (1982).
6. See Justice Stevens' comment in Colorado v. Nunez, 465 U.S. 324, 327-29

JUDICATURE

(1984).

7. 405 U.S. 228 (1972) (dismissed as improvidently granted) (whether Fair
Labor Standards Act case can be brought when violation is also subject to collective
bargaining grievance).
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[expected] broad scope .. .but apply only to grievances 'pertaining
to a violation of the Agreement."' For this reason, and because the
issue presented gave no opportunity to address another question about
barring a statutory remedy, "circumstances . . .not fully apprehended
at the time certiorari was granted" led the Court to dismiss the writ
as improvidently granted.'
Because at times, as in that case, the Court says explicitly that
oral argument led to its changed view of a case, per curiams issued
after oral argument help us deal with the claim, made by lawyers and
judges alike, that oral argument can make a difference in case
outcomes. Examining such cases also allows us to see whether disputes
among the justices about reaching the merits are foreshadowed in
questions asked at argument, although the infrequent participation by
some justices at argument makes this more difficult.
These per curiams also help cast light on issue fluidity within the
Court, the process by which the Court expands or narrows issues to
9
be determined or suppresses issues to which review has been granted.
Oral argument, because it allows the justices to explore aspects of
any issues they believe may help resolve a ruling, may provide them
with information allowing them to narrow an issue; to postpone
dealing with it by remanding the case for reconsideration in light of
some event that has intervened since review was granted, or so that
lower courts can enlarge the record; or even to discard it entirely.
Oral argument may also lead the Court to decide that issues should
be added. At times, this results in request for reargument that will
include such additional issues, 10 although there are also instances when
the Court's rulings deal with issues the dissenters say have not been
briefed or argued.
An example of how oral argument can help narrow issues in
the process of issue fluidity is Secretary of the Navy v.

8. Id. at 230.
9. On issue fluidity, see S. Sidney Ulmer, Issue Fluidity in the U.S. Supreme
Court: A Conceptual Analysis, in SUPEME COURT ACTrWsM & RESTRAINT 319-50

(Stephen C. Halpern & Charles Lamb eds., 1982); J. Woodford Howard, The Fluidity

of Judicial Choice, 62 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 43 (1968).
10. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 332 (1985) ("Although we
originally granted certiorari to decide the issue of the appropriate remedy in juvenile
court proceedings for unlawful school searches, our doubts regarding the wisdom of
deciding that question in isolation from the broader question of what limits, if any,
the Fourth Amendment places on the activities of school authorities prompted us to
order reargument on that question."). Here, of course, the Court majority may have
been searching for a way to limit the Court's earlier more expansive Fourth Amend-
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Avrech. 1' Having granted review to a case in which the court of
appeals had held a portion of the Code of Military Justice unconstitutionally vague, after oral argument the Court had "directed counsel
to file supplemental briefs on the issues of the jurisdiction of the
District Court and the exhaustion of remedies." At that point, the
Court found itself, "[wjithout the benefit of further oral argument,
... unwilling to decide the difficult jurisdictional issue which the
parties have briefed.' 1 2 However, availability of another ground for
decision - that the recently decided case of Parker v. Levy 3 required
reversal of the ruling of unconstitutionality - allowed the Court to
avoid the problematic jurisdictional question. The justices thought
that question could not be adequately pursued in this case, because
"even the most diligent and zealous advocate could find his
ardor
somewhat dampened in arguing a jurisdictional issue" with the decision on the merits "foreordained. ' '14
Short of being present at the justices' conference, or having direct
evidence in the justices' papers, which - on the basis of others' past
use of them - seem not to include material on this point, we cannot
be sure of the connection between oral argument and the Court's
decision to dispose of a case per curiam without reaching the merits.
However, the Court provides some clues in its per curiam opinions,
as do individual justices in their separate accompanying opinions.
Inferences can also be drawn from the juxtaposition of oral argument
with the Court's few words in its per curiam dispositions, including
the higher rate of activity by the justices at oral argument in cases
later issued per curiam - a possible indication of efforts to find ways
to dispose of such cases without reaching the merits.' 5
ment jurisprudence, just as it sought to do when, in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213
(1983), it ordered reargument on the question of the "good faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule - only to find after reargument, with some obvious embarrassment,
that the issue had not been treated by the lower court and thus was not available for
decision in Gates - although the Court did reach the issue soon after in United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
11. 418 U.S. 676 (1974) (rev'd) (challenging portion of Code of Military Justice,
jurisdiction of district court, and exhaustion of remedies).
12. Id. at 677.
13. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
14. Avrech, 418 U.S. at 678.
15. This is a very preliminary inference based on data from the 1980 and 1981
Terms. Those data show a statistically significant difference in levels of participation
between per curiam and signed opinion cases, with higher participation in the former.
James N. Schubert, Oral Argument & Size of Majority in Supreme Court Decision
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At times the Court makes only passing reference to the relevance
of briefing and oral argument to the decision reached; at other times,
the justices indicate that something that transpired at oral argument
was determinative of the Court's disposition. If the justices question
counsel about whether to reach the issue presented, at a minimum
this indicates that the Court's disposition of such a case without
reaching the merits did not simply occur to the justices after oral
argument but was on their minds, or was revealed to them, then.
In order to determine whether oral argument has indeed affected
the Court's reaching the merits or has instead led it to a nonmerits
disposition, we read the Court's per curiam opinions, and we find
that at times the Court provides only a general passing reference to
briefs and oral argument, saying, for example, that the justices decline
to decide the arguments presented "because examination of the case,
after full briefing and oral argument, has convinced us that the writ
6
of certiorari was improvidently granted."' In one of the cases in our
sample, the Court said, "[H]aving scrutinized the record and considered the briefs and oral arguments submitted on both sides," the
7
claim does not merit full review.' In another, the Court's decision
"that there is merit in the State's position that the record does not
permit a satisfactory evaluation of the facts" concerning the seizure
of the defendant came "after considering the parties' briefs and
hearing oral argument."'" A decision that a case was "an inappropriate vehicle for deciding a question of such far-reaching importance"
as to whether transactional or use immunity was required came
"[alfter considering the briefs and oral arguments of the parties,"
which revealed an intervening New York Court of Appeals ruling that
19
New York required transactional immunity. These statements might
indicate that oral argument was relevant to disposition of the case,
but one cannot tell from them how much a part it played. In these
cases, briefing and argument' serve to clarify a point, but they can
also confirm confusion. Thus the Court noted in its per curiam
Making (paper presented to New York State Political Science Association meetings)
(Apr. 20, 1991).
16. New York v. Uplinger, 467 U.S. 246, 248 (1984) (per curiam).
17. Monks v. New Jersey, 398 U.S. 71 (1970) (per curiam) (dismissed as
improvidently granted) (coerced confession by juvenile).
18. Morales v. New York, 396 U.S. 102, 105 (1969) (per curiam) (vacated and
remanded) (improper detention).
19. Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 548-49 (1971) (per curiam) (dismissed
as improvidently granted) (whether use or transactional immunity required).
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disposition of California v. Krivda2 ° that after briefing and oral
argument, the Court could not learn the constitutional basis for a
lower court ruling - whether it was based on the federal constitution,
the state constitution, or both. 21
Such comments only indicate the relevance of, but not a primary
role for, oral argument in the Court's disposition of the case. There
are, however, instances where the per curiam does indicate a greater
role for oral argument. In some situations, it makes facts clearer. For
example, in a case in which picketing obstruction to a store was at
the heart of the case as initially presented, that element was "overshadowed by the special facts of the case as they were finally clarified
on oral argument.' '22 Oral argument, if it does not directly clarify the
facts, may lead the justices to "closer review of the record," where
additional facts not clear from the certiorari papers or lower court
opinions may be revealed, leading the Court to believe that certiorari
should be dismissed as improvidently granted.2 3
Some of the Court's opinions show that oral argument clearly
has played a more determinative role. One possibility is that a point
made in the initial papers and in the briefs was made persuasive by
oral argument. In Mitchell v. Donovan,24 in which the Court ruled it
lacked jurisdiction over the appeal in a post-election continuation of
an effort to invalidate the Communist Control Act, the per curiam
concluded, "The appellees have persisted in their claim that the Court
lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal, and after hearing oral
argument we have concluded that they are right. ' 25
More crucial are those situations where counsel makes specific
acknowledgements which affect the Court's view of a case. Certainly
this occurs in cases in which the Court reaches the merits. Spence v.
Washington,26 a Vietnam-era flag desecration case, was one per curiam
in which this was true. For one thing, the State's lawyer "pursued
20. 409 U.S. 33 (1972) (per curiam) (vacated and remanded) (search issue; state
or federal constitutional basis for lower court ruling).
21. Id. at 35.

22. Taggart v. Weinacker's, Inc., 397 U.S. 223, 225 (1970) (per curiam)
(dismissed as improvidently granted) (injunction against picketing of business).
23. Jones v. State Board of Educ., 397 U.S. 31, 32 (1970) (per curiam)
(dismissed as improvidently granted) (First Amendment and due process questions in
suspension of student).

24. 398 U.S. 427 (1970) (per curiam) (vacated and remanded) (post-election

attempt to invalidate Communist Control Act; no appeal from order granting or
denying only declaratory judgment).
25. Id. at 430.

26. 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam).
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. ..the breach-of-peace theory discarded by the state court" - and
pursued only that rationale - rather than relying on the basis on
which the Washington Supreme Court had upheld the law. 27 For
another, "Counsel for the State conceded that promoting respect for
the flag is not a legitimate state interest." 2 8
Other comments by counsel led the Court to proceed to the
merits. In Gomez v. Perez,29 on entitlement of illegitimate children to
welfare benefits, we find the Court commenting, "There was some
question at argument whether the statutory scheme relating to paternal
support of children was properly drawn into question in the state
courts"; reporting that the state had said it was not prejudiced by
appellant's not pointing to particular statutes; and saying, "On the
contrary, the State asserted here that it was prepared to meet appellants constitutional attack on its statutes on the merits.' '30
Of greater interest are those situations in which counsel's statements or acknowledgements lead the Court not to deal with issues for
which review has been granted. The Court's treatment of racial
discrimination and segregation cases produced some examples. In the
Atlanta school desegregation case, Calhoun v. Latimer 3 the city
school board attorney indicated at the argument that since 1961 the
city had voluntarily undertaken to proceed beyond mere administration of a pupil placement statute and that the board was undertaking
further changes to hasten the desegregation process, although he
candidly conceded that some past devices were illegal. This confused
the Court as to exactly what changes had been made, and it vacated32
and remanded for a district court hearing on the new developments.
27. Id. at 411.
28. Id. at 412 n.6 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 30).
29. 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (per curiam) (rev'd and remanded) (violation of equal
protection to deny child support from father of illegitimate child).
30. Id. at 537 n.2 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument) One might note here
that Justice Stewart, who would have dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted,
thought that "[ulpon the submission of briefs and oral argument, it became clear
that neither statute had been the actual subject of litigation in the courts of Texas."
Id. at 539. Thus, just as plenary consideration,. including oral argument, can lead
justices to divergent positions on the merits, it can also lead them to divergent
positions on whether issues are properly before the court. Also, at least important
enough to be noted in the text of the Court's per curiam was that "at argument
here, the attorney for the State of Texas, appearing as amicus curiae, conceded that
but for the fact that this child is illegitimate she would be entitled to support from
appellee under the laws of Texas." Id. at 537 n.2 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument

24).

31. 377 U.S. 263 (1963) (per curiam).
32. Id.; see STEPHEN L. WASBY ET AL., DESEGREGATION FROM Brown to Alexander: An Exploration of Supreme Court Strategies 197-98 (1977).
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NAACP Legal Defense Fund Director Jack Greenberg reported
that in oral argument in Diamond v. Louisiana,33 a civil rights
demonstration case, Justice Black had asked "whether or not it was
the contention of counsel that while this particular defendant really
had not acted properly, he was being prosecuted improperly." In
response, counsel conceded that the defendant had not been acting
properly but also argued that the prosecution was technically deficient.14 This concession put the justices, who had not previously
affirmed a state court conviction stemming from a civil rights incident,
in the position of having to do that and to serve as well as a "court
of errors" on state procedure if they were to reverse on the ground
that the prosecution was procedurally defective. Thus, they dismissed
certiorari as improvidently granted - the only action available to
avoid either approving the prosecution or approving the defendant's
action. "
In the more recent period of our study (1969-1981), we find
additional situations where the Court's per curiam opinions suggest
that specific acknowledgements by counsel have led to a nonmerits
ruling. Sometimes both counsel agree on a point that leads the Court
to its conclusion. In Huffman v. Boersen,3 6 remanded for consideration of supervening legislation, the court noted, "Counsel for both
parties were of the opinion on oral argument here that this new statute
is applicable to the instant case." '3 7 Similarly, in Askew v. Hargrave,"
"the colloquy on oral argument with counsel for the parties" led the
Court to understand that state court cases based on state constitutional
law might sustain appellant's claim. This would "obviate the necessity
of determining the Fourteenth Amendment question" for which the
Court had taken the case, thus leading the Court to vacate and
remand .9
If comments of both counsel can be determinative for the majority, they can also be persuasive to dissenting justices. The majority
found that defendant's conviction mooted a case testing the denial of
33. 376 U.S. 201 (1964).
34. Id.; see also Jack Greenberg, The Supreme Court, Civil Rights & Civil

Dissonance, 77 YALE L.J. 1520, 1534 (1968).
35. WASBY, supra note 32, at 357.

36. 406 U.S. 337 (1972) (per curiam) (vacated and remanded) (challenge to
dismissal of indigent's appeal for failure to post bond).
37. Id. at 338. The per curiam also quoted from oral argument as to a
stipulation by counsel for respondent about another aspect of the case. Id. at n.2.
38. 401 U.S. 476 (1971) (per curiam) (vacated and remanded) (equal protection
challenges to distribution of taxing authority for education).
39. Id. at 478.
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pretrial bail. However, quoting both attorneys' direct statements at
oral argument that the state statute in question did apply to bail
pending appeal, Justice White would have decided the case on the
merits or at least could have allowed the lower court to explore
mootness further because bail pending appeal would be determined
on the same criteria applied to pretrial bail.4 0
In DeBacker v. Brainerd,41 the Court was to consider several
aspects of due process in juvenile proceedings. The Court found the
case not "an appropriate one" for considering the right to jury trial
in such cases because this proceeding had taken place before the
Court's application of the right to a jury trial to the states in Duncan
v. Louisiana,42 which had already been held to be nonretroactive; the
Court had not needed oral argument for this part of its ruling. Oral
argument was, however, relevant to the Court's dismissal of the
question of the proper standard of proof because, in answer to a
question, the juvenile's counsel had made the "commendably forthright explanation" that the evidence against his client, was sufficient
even under a reasonable doubt standard, a concession which made
the case "not an appropriate vehicle for consideration of the standard
'4
of proof in juvenile proceedings."
In Maxwell v. Bishop," which some thought would be the Court's
first major death penalty ruling, an Arkansas law on reduction of
verdict was mentioned during oral argument, so the Court remanded
the case to the lower court, "where the issue that has belatedly been
brought to our attention may be fully considered." ' 45 The Court also
noted that it had already granted certiorari in McGautha and Crampton, which raised the issues for which certiorari had been granted in
Maxwell v. Bishop.
Moon v. Maryland,46 one of the cases in our sample, provides a
dramatic instance where a counsel's concession led the Court not to
reach the merits. The Maryland Court of Appeals set aside an initial
40. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 485 n.2 (1982) (per curiam). Justice White
quoted three questions-and-answers with one attorney and two questions-and-answers
with the other.
41. 396 U.S. 28 (1961) (dismissed as improvidently granted) (whether jury
required in juvenile case).
42. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
43. DeBacker, 396 U.S. at 31.
44. 398 U.S. 262 (1970).
45. Id. at 266 n.3, 267.
46. 398 U.S. 319 (1970) (per curiam) (dismissed as improvidently granted)
(retroactivity of North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), invalidating higher
sentence on retrial without explanation by judge).
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conviction for armed robbery with a 12-year sentence. On retrial, the
judge sentenced defendant to 20 years, and the state's appellate courts
upheld the conviction. The Supreme Court, granting review, asked
for briefing on the retroactivity of North Carolina v. Pearce,47 concerning vindictiveness at resentencing after retrial following a successful appeal. Dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted
instead of reaching this question, the per curiam not only noted that
an affidavit by the judge stating the reasons for his sentence had been
made available as an appendix to the State's brief, but also pointed
to the "dispositive development" that "counsel forthrightly stated in
the course of oral argument" that the judge had not been vindictive. 4
This statement made the whole basis for granting certiorari disappear
instantly; thus oral argument decided the Court's disposition. A
comparable determinative statement came in Vitek v. Jones,49 a challenge to transferring a prisoner to a mental hospital. There the Court
was told at oral argument, by the individual's counsel, that the
individual had accepted parole, agreed to treatment, and was in fact
accepting treatment. 0 For the Court, that was enough to vacate and
remand for mootness.
A more recent case, California v. Rooney,51 had been taken by
the Court to explore an individual's expectation of privacy in a bag
deposited in garbage. After quoting from the State's state appellate
court rehearing petition and certiorari petition, the Court pointed to
an oral argument exchange in which the State's prosecutor admitted
that no material found under the search warrant had been suppressed
and acknowledged that the State really wanted to have the Supreme
Court overrule California v. Krivda, which it had sent back to the
47. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
48. Moon, 398 U.S. at 320-21. The State's lawyer argued that Pearce was
inapplicable because "at no time has the defendant Moon maintained that his sentence
was increased because the judge vindictively increased his sentence." Id. (Transcript
of Oral Argument at 28-29). During rebuttal, petitioner's lawyer provided the clincher,
with the statement:
I have never contended that Judge Pugh was vindictive .... The state has
been consistently setting up . . . the straw man: that the vindictiveness of
the second trial judge is the issue before the Court. It has nothing to do
with this appeal.
Id. (Transcript of Oral Argument at 35).
49. 436 U.S. 407 (1978) (per curiam) (vacated and remanded for mootness)
(transfer of prisoner to mental hospital).
50. Id. at 410.
51. 483 U.S. 307 (1987) (per curiam) (dismissed as improvidently granted)
(expectation of privacy in bag of garbage).
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California courts because the basis of the state court's ruling had
been unclear, as noted above. That the Rooney case was "a vehicle
of review," as the State's lawyer acknowledged, led fairly directly to
52
the Court's decision to DIG the case.
In most situations, the Court's discussion of, and citation to,
oral argument is brief - encompassing, at most, a sentence with
perhaps a few lines of oral argument quoted, and that often in a
footnote. However, in Jones v. Hildebrant,5" a case in which certiorari
was dismissed as improvidently granted because the claim was not
properly presented, the Court provided an explanation, not usual in
a DIG disposition; drew on oral argument in doing so; and stated
that oral argument had led to its conclusion. Review had been granted
to determine whether state limits on damages in wrongful-death
statutes could control an action brought under section 1983.54 The per
curiam first noted that the petitioner (the mother of a son killed by
a law enforcement officer) was making a claim "based on her personal
liberty," rather than "one of pecuniary loss resulting from her son's
wrongful death;" as delineated by counsel, the mother's claim "has
nothing to do with an action for 'wrongful death' as defined by the
state law."" For the court, petitioner had shifted position in the case,
"such that the question presented in the petition for certiorari is all
but mooted by petitioner's oral argument' '56 - a clear indication of
the importance oral argument played.
Even if it played a decisive role for the majority in its decision
not to reach the merits, counsel's statements did not have the same
effect on three dissenting justices, who made even heavier use of
argument than did the majority. Quoting argument and otherwise
referring to it, Justice White thought the mother had not "abandoned
her claim, expressly rejected by the Colorado Supreme Court, that
section 1983 affords a remedy to petitioner in her capacity as a parent
wholly independent of state law." ' 57 Further citing argument by petitioner's counsel, White argued that counsel had stated his claims

52. Id. at 311 n.2.

53. 432 U.S. 183 (1977) (per curiam) (dismissed as improvidently granted)
(applicability of limits on damages in wrongful death statutes in cases under 42
U.S.C. § 1983).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
55. Jones, 432 U.S. at 185 (citing several pages from the Transcript of Oral
Argument at 4-5); see also id. at 186 nn.4-5 (discussing "explicit acknowledge[ments]"
by counsel and a "contention" of counsel).
56. Id. at 187.

57. Id. at 194-95 (White, J., dissenting).
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clearly; he also discussed counsel's concession of not having pressed
one of his client's claims, the reasons for that action, and his present
8
position on the matter.
IV.

TRANSCRIPT AND COURT'S OPINION

The above discussion of Moon indicates a match between the
transcript of oral argument and the specific comments of counsel
pointed to by the Court as the basis for its disposition, and indicates
the importance of examining the transcriptions to find the linkage
between the Court's opinion and what was actually said to the Court.
There are, of course, instances where a comparison of the Court's
ruling and the transcript is not useful. The most obvious situation is
when the Court dismisses certiorari as improvidently granted with
only an opaque statement that examination of the briefs and record
indicates that the claim does not warrant plenary consideration - or,
even worse, with nothing more than the "Dismissed as improvidently
granted" notation. Here there is not even a hint of what in the Court's
examination - of briefs, argument, or record - led to that conclusion
and one is left to speculate.
One case in our sample fits that situation. In Monks v. New
Jersey, 9 the claim under review was that a juvenile had been coerced
into giving a confession. A reading of the transcript of oral argument
shows nothing unusual, except for the possibility that a probation
officer without legal training served as "counsel" for the juvenile. As
Justice Stewart asked, "We've never had a case, I guess, have we, in
which the person interrogated has had assigned to him by the juvenile
court, somebody like this man?" Counsel responded, "Never. And
that is the one - and that is the one legal wrinkle that makes this
case different from any other. '" It would also, because of its factual
uniqueness, be a good reason for the Court not to rest a rule of broad
applicability on it. *
Another situation where one cannot determine from examination
of the oral argument transcript why the Court used a per curiam
disposition is when several cases on a common issue are argued on
the same day or consecutive days and the Court then decides one or
more, the lead cases, with full signed opinions, but disposes of the
58. Id. at 195-96 (White, J., dissenting).
59. 398 U.S. 71 (1970).

60. Id. (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 13); see also some questioning
about the assistance given by the probation officer at Transcript of Oral Argument
at 32 et seq.
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others only with per curiam rulings. In such situations, the decision
to treat some cases one way and some the other is not apparent from
argument. An example is provided by a set of cases accepted to
determine whether the Constitution mandated transactional or only
use immunity before someone could be required to testify against
himself. In the lead cases, Kastigar v. United States6' and Zicarelli v.
New Jersey Investigation Commission,62 the Court held that only use
immunity was compelled by the Constitution. Then, in Sarno v.
Illinois Crime Investigating Commission,63 in which oral argument
had dealt with what Illinois allowed concerning immunity, the Court,
observing that since there was no disagreement between the parties
that Illinois' immunity requirement satisfied what was now the Kastigar-Zicarellistandard, dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted,
leaving any uncertainties over the scope of the Illinois law to that
state's courts. There is little from oral argument itself to indicate why
Kastigar and Zicarelli, both of which affirmed lower court rulings,
not Sarno, received signed opinions and Sarno a nonmerits disposition.64
At times the Court has not referred to oral argument in the per
curiam but may well have used oral argument in reaching its result.
For example, in its nonmerits disposition in Conway v. California
Adult Authority,65 a challenge to California's indeterminate sentencing
law, the Court referred only to changed facts apparent from the
briefs, not to oral argument, yet examination of oral argument reveals
references to those matters. The case had been accepted to consider
Conway's claim that the Adult Authority extended his date of release
from prison because he would not admit to having committed the
crime for which he had been sentenced and thus violated his Fifth
Amendment self-incrimination rights. During the appearance by Conway's attorney at oral argument, in addition to consideration of the
indeterminate sentencing law, much time was taken up by the question
of whether federal habeas corpus had been properly denied and by
matters of federal appellate procedure; however, one issue that recurred at several points was the limited factual material on the record.
61. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
62. 406 U.S. 472 (1972).
63. 406 U.S. 482 (1972) (per curiam) (dismissed as improvidently granted
(whether use or transactional immunity required).
64. Sarno, 406 U.S. at 482; Zicarelli, 406 U.S. at 472; Kastigar, 406 U.S. at
441.
65. 396 U.S. 107 (1969) (per curiam) (dismissed as improvidently granted)
(habeas challenge to self-incrimination violation by prison authorities).
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During argument by respondent's attorney, however, new information was provided. As apparently had been noted in the State's
brief, the State's lawyer indicated at argument that petitioner had
been properly given notice of a prison rule violation, which would
potentially result in refixing the prison term; at the hearing on the
66
violation, he was found guilty of fighting with another prisoner.
This provided support for the Court's conclusion that there were
grounds completely independent of any possible vindictiveness by the
Adult Authority; oral argument, while perhaps not determinative,
certainly could have reinforced what the Court discovered, or could
have discovered, in the briefs.
Examination of oral argument transcripts in five additional cases
reveals further evidence that oral argument does provide a basis for
the Court's nonmerits dispositions. In Morales v. New York, 67 the
Court's determination that "the record does not permit a satisfactory
evaluation of the facts surrounding the apprehension and detention
of Morales" 6 has a foundation in the comments by both attorneys
at oral argument, although those comments were only a small part of
the argument. Burton B. Roberts, for the State, argued that the
government was not able to develop the record "because the question
of unreasonable detention was . .. raised for the first time in the

[New York] Court of Appeals." Moreover, in answer to an observation from Justice Harlan "that the State might have more proof to
put in as to the background under which the focus of the police
suspicion of this man come to their attention," appellant's counsel
said, "They could perhaps go out and beat the bushes now, five years
after the event and find some more evidence. And perhaps this Court
could be convinced to send it back for hearing," but he did not think
the record required that. 69
In Jones v. State Board of Education,70 in dismissing certiorari
as improvidently granted, the Court had referred to additional factors
revealed in a "closer review of the record" after oral argument.
Argument had made clear that the student's suspension was based in
part on his lying at the hearing held to judge him. No justice
questioned petitioner's lawyer when he mentioned this in his initial
presentation. 7' Later, however, there were two question-and-answer
66. Id. (Transcript of Oral Argument at 30-31).
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

396 U.S. 102 (1969).
Id. at 105.
Id. (Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, 24).
397 U.S. 31 (1970).
Id. at 32 (Transcript of Oral Argument at 4).
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exchanges in which the university's counsel stated that Jones had
"lied to the committee.' '72 This led to an extended exchange with
student's counsel during the latter's rebuttal. He was asked directly,
"Aren't you arguing that a college would not have a right to expel a
man if they caught him in an outright falsehood?" Although he tried
to avoid the thrust of the question by responding, "I don't think that
issue is in the case," Justices Black and Marshall pursued him with a
half-dozen additional questions on that topic."
Oral argument in Piccirillo v. New York,7 4 where the Supreme
Court, in dismissing certiorari as improvidently granted, referred to
the New York court's subsequent ruling about transactional immunity,
contains discussion of that case. Justice Blackmun raised the issue
with petitioner's attorney by asking, "If this case were being decided
today by the New York Court of Appeals, do you think it would be
decided the same way ... ?" Counsel, while arguing that the result
in her case would be the same, gave an extended response about what
the New York court had said, arguing that the state court did not
give full effect to the proper federal constitutional rule. Justice
Blackmun also discussed with state's counsel, who had mentioned the
76
intervening case, why the New York court changed its mind.
Krivda, where the Court's nonmerits disposition turned on whether
the state court based its ruling on the state or federal constitutions,
demonstrates a clear linkage between argument and disposition. Oral
argument contained an extended discussion with both attorneys as to
the basis of the California court's ruling. Justice Marshall pressed
Deputy Attorney General Russell lungerich as to whether, even if
California won a favorable federal constitutional ruling, the state
might simply shift to use of state grounds. When lungerich said that
could occur, Marshall asked, "And what would you win then?"
Answer: "Well, under the circumstances, we would have a clear ruling
that it was not required under the Federal Constitution.1 77 Justice
Brennan pressed Iungerich on prior Supreme Court difficulties in
72. Id. (Transcript of Oral Argument at 25).
73. Id. (Transcript of Oral Argument at 35); see also id. (Transcript of Oral
Argument at 36, 39).
74. 400 U.S. 548 (1971).
75. Id. (Transcript of Oral Argument at 10).
76. The State had not argued the transactional immunity issue in the state
courts, said the lawyer, "because we all assumed that the New York statute granted
transactional immunity as a matter of state law" and had been surprised by the state
court action. Id. (Transcript of Oral Argument at 22-23).
77. California v. Krivada, 412 U.S. 919 (1973) (quoting Transcript of Oral
Argument at 24).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 13

determining the basis of California Supreme Court rulings. In colloquy
with Krivda's attorney, Roger S. Hanson, Justice Rehnquist, after
adverting to the disagreement between counsel as to whether the
California Supreme Court had decided on state or federal grounds,
asked, "If we should be in some doubt, wouldn't the natural thing
for us to do - be to remand under Minnesota v. National Tea and
that line of cases?", with Justice Brennan indicating "That's what
we did in Kirschner. ' 78 In so doing, they actually suggested the
disposition the Court adopted only two weeks after argument. Shortly
thereafter, Rehnquist said the Kirschner and Minnesota Tea situation
was one where "[tihe Court didn't question the fact that the State
could afford broader protection in [sic: than under] the Federal
Constitution, but we felt it was unclear whether or not the State had
felt compelled by the Federal Constitution or was acting under its
79
own aegis."
Oral argument in Tacon v. Arizona,80 another "DIG" disposition,
also contained considerable treatment of whether the issue for review
- whether a person could be tried in absentia when he voluntarily
left the state and was financially unable to return - had been raised
below. The justices engaged Robert J. Hirsch, petitioner's counsel, in
extended questioning about what the lower court had decided, whether
he had raised the issue, and whether the lower court's ruling encompassed a response to the issue. Shortly after Justice Stewart expressed
concern that Hirsch had not specifically referred to particular constitutional provisions and that the Arizona court had not dealt with an
issue Hirsch said he raised and argued, Justice White pressed Hirsch
on whether the federal question had been decided, saying at one point
that it had been decided. Hirsch insisted he had raised it, but saying
at one point that it had been decided by "implication," hedged on
whether it had been decided. 8' Justice Stewart then returned to the
fray to press the point that the state court had not located the issue
explicitly and to find out that Hirsch had not challenged the constitutionality of one of the rules involved.
The first thirty-two pages of the OA transcript in Tacon is taken
up with Hirsch's presentation and the justices' intense questioning of
him, while appellee's presentation and responses consume only seven.
This shows that appellee knew when not to engage in overkill when
78. Id. (Transcript of Oral Argument at 29).
79. Id. (Transcript of Oral Argument at 32).
80. 410 U.S. 351 (1973) (per curiam) (dismissed as improvidently granted) (trial
in absentia when person voluntarily left state).
81. Id. (Transcript of Oral Argument at 25-26, 32-33).
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the justices' questioning of his opponent showed the direction of the
Court's persuasion. Of course, William P. Dixon was careful to say,
in answer to a question from Justice Douglas about whether the
federal question was presented in the case, "Not properly presented
... I think it could have been perhaps come before this Court in a
'8 2
proper state, but I don't think it is proper before you today.
Douglas, joined by Marshall and Brennan, dissented nonetheless,
reaching the merits.

IV.

THE RULE OF FOUR

The linkage between oral argument and per curiam dispositions
should be clear from this examination of our sample cases. Beyond
showing that oral argument produces further information for the
Court, that linkage raises at least two additional issues about the
Court's decision-making. One is the relationship between the Rule of
Four, in which the votes of only four justices are needed to grant
review to a case, and reaching a nonmerits disposition, particularly
dismissal of certiorari as improvidently granted. The granting or
denying of review, and the Court's rulings on the merits or not once
review is granted, implicate the Court's gate-keeping and agendasetting functions. The second issue is whether the Court's mechanisms
for obtaining relevant information were adequate or effective, at least
during the period being studied.
Use of per curiam dispositions not dealing with the merits, after
oral argument has revealed a situation of which the Court was not
previously aware, implicates the Rule of Four. This is because of the
possibility that a five-justice majority is undercutting the norm that
all justices will reach the merits once four of their colleagues vote to
accept a case. 3 For example, the Rule of Four became an issue when
the Court DIG'd a case involving displacement of people by a
highway. Four justices dissented on the basis of the Rule of Four,
with Justice Douglas arguing that only four members of the Court
had voted for certiorari, sufficient to have the case decided on the
merits; the others had voted to dismiss. This dissent prompted an
opinion by Justice Harlan concurring in the disposition. He explained
82. Id. (Transcript of Oral Argument at 40).
83. H.W. Perry suggests that it takes six judges to decide that a case be decided
on the basis of the certiorari papers, without full briefing and argument. He quotes
a justice he interviewed: "The rule now, well, it is not a rule, but is a convention, is
that it takes six to do that ... rather than five." H.W. PERRY, DECIDING TO DEMCE
100 (1991).
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that certiorari was no longer appropriate in view of the small number
of people involved, the repeal of one statute and enactment of a new
one, and the abandonment of a claim and a shift in the remedy
sought. He noted that "we were informed that, as of the date of oral
argument, less than 10 persons remained to be displaced by this
8 4
federal project."
In Burrell v. McCray,85 Justices Brennan and Marshall complained that a justice who had originally voted to deny certiorari
should not vote to DIG a case unless well-understood standards for
dismissing the writ of certiorari - "when the more intensive consideration of the issues and the record in the case that attends full
briefing and oral argument reveals that conditions originally thought
to justify granting the writ of certiorari are not in fact present" were met; otherwise "impermissible violence" would be done to the
Rule of Four.8 6
Yet Justice Stevens thought the Rule of Four had not been
violated because a colleague who had voted to grant certiorari had
joined in the vote to dismiss. Stevens had regularly demonstrated his
concern about protecting the integrity of the Rule of Four, although
he had argued for a Rule of Five.8 7 Yet for him, a DIG disposition
was appropriate not only when "circumstances disclosed by a careful
study of the record were not fully apprehended at the time the writ
was granted," but also "when our further study of the law discloses
that there is no need for an opinion of this Court on the questions
presented by the petition." 88 Agreeing that "the questions in this case
are important," Stevens thought "the state of the law applicable to
the facts disclosed by this record is sufficiently clear" that a DIG
disposition was "a permissible exercise of the Court's discretionary
power," 8 9 although he preferred an affirmance after argument.
In a later case, Justice Stevens wrote that judicial self-restraint
allows justices to DIG a case when study convinces them "that its
posture, record, or presentation of issues makes it an unwise vehicle
for exercising the 'gravest and most delicate' function that this Court
is called upon to perform - a ruling in a case with constitutional

84. Triangle Improvement Council v. Ritchie, 402 U.S. 497, 499 (1971).

85. 426 U.S. 471 (1976).
86. Id. at 473-74 (1976).

87. John Paul Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1, 17 (1983).

88. Burrell, 426 U.S. at 472.
89. Id. at 472-73.
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issues.' '9 Noting that briefing and argument will have taken place so
"there is always an important intervening development that may be
decisive," 9' Stevens thought this intervening development does not
itself justify a dismissal: there must be something more, a significant
change in the posture of the case. Oral argument performs one of its
important functions in revealing such changes. It thus allows the
Court to perform its central role more effectively; by discarding cases
in which issues are not "properly presented," the Court can give
better attention to other cases and then, at least in theory, provide
better guidance to lower court judges, lawyers, and primary actors.
V.

WHEN THE COURT LEARNS

If oral argument reveals new information to the Court, leading
to a nonmerits disposition, one must face the question of whether
mechanisms by which the Court obtains necessary, indeed crucial,
information are functioning properly. It is possible that the severe
decrease in per curiams issued after argument, especially those not
reaching the merits because of a change in the posture of the case,
means the Court is now obtaining information more effectively - or
is choosing cases for review more carefully. (However, it may mean
only that the Court has decided to abandon this type of disposition.)
This question leads us to look at when the Court obtains this
information, particularly in relation to when argument is held.
One suggestion is that there may be some connection between
the decline in the use of per curiams and development of the pool of
justices' clerks to prepare basic memoranda about certiorari petitions
for the participating justicesY2 It is possible that the pool provided
members of the Court with more accurate information on which to
decide to grant review, reducing the situations in which the justices
would find at oral argument that a case was quite different from what
was expected, requiring a disposition in which the Court did not reach
the merits. However, the pool memos are not thought to be more
thorough than non-pool memos (by the justices' own clerks), and are
if anything less extensive, with additional work done in individual
justices' chambers.9 3 Thus the pool is not likely to be the explanation
for the decline in per curiams. It is more likely that the Court receives
90. New York v. Uplinger, 467 U.S. 246, 250-51 (1984) (per curiam) (dismissed
as improvidently granted) (loitering for soliciting deviate sexual behavior).
91. Id. at 250.
92. We thank Richard Pacelle for this suggestion.
93. See PERRtY, supra note 83.
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relevant information from the parties after review is granted.
In some situations, oral argument illuminates or casts a different
light on facts noted in certiorari petitions or in appeals - and thus
already available to the Court. However, a reading of the Court's
nonmerits dispositions makes clear that there are also instances in
which, although crucial changes have occurred in the case, the Court
has not learned of them. An example is Morris v. Weinberger,94 where
Congress had changed the relevant statute twenty days after certiorari
was granted. This led to a DIG disposition but not until argument
had been held. 95
In some of these situations, lawyers have not called attention to
key elements in cases prior to argument. For example, in one picketing
case in which state courts had issued an injunction, during the
pendency of the appeal in state court the owner of the premises had
leased most of the property to other stores, greatly reducing the
amount of interference with his own business. As the Supreme Court
observed in dismissing the case,
While the changed circumstances do not necessarily make the
controversy moot, they are such that, if known at the time
the petition for a writ of certiorari was acted upon, we would
not have granted it for such small embers of controversy that
may remain do not present the threat of grave state-federal
conflict that we need sit to resolve.9
Such instances in which changes in the posture of the case have
occurred between the Supreme Court's granting of review and oral
argument and have not been communicated to the Court are troublesome because they raise a question about whether the lawyers have
performed their proper functions and informed the Court of the
changes.
One can see this in a case in which the Court learned only at
argument that the proprietorship at the heart of a license-denial case
had gone out of business: both lawyers told the Court "that no
decision on the merits by this Court can now have an effect on the
Attic Lounge's liquor license. "97 The seriousness with which the Court
views such an occurrence can be seen in the Court's following this
94. 410 U.S. 422 (1973).
95. Id.
96. Taggart v. Weinacker's, Inc., 397 U.S. 223, 224-25 (1970).
97. Board of License Comm'r v. Pastore, 469 U.S. 238, 239 (1985) (per curiam)
(dismissed as moot) (denial of license) (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 28,
31).
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recitation of how it had come to learn of this key fact with this harsh
reminder:
It is appropriate to remind counsel that they have a continuing
duty to inform the Court of any development which may
conceivably affect the outcome of the litigation. Fusari v.
Steinberg (Burger, C.J., concurring). When a development
after this Court grants certiorari or notes probable jurisdiction
could have the effect of depriving the Court of jurisdiction
due to the absence of a continuing case or controversy, that
development should be called to the attention of the Court
98
without delay.
Nor has the Court been hesitant to make other remarks, of
critical tone, about processes followed by institutional litigants that
cause the Court unnecessary work. In the Conway case, discussed
earlier, "documentary, evidence that the actual facts simply do not
present the issues for which certiorari was granted by us" had been
revealed. 99 The Court pointed to "the policy of the Attorney General
of California ...

to make no response to habeas corpus petitions of

state prisoners unless the court in which a petition is filed requests a
response" as part of the reason for the "imposition on this Court"
in this case; the state had made matters worse when it "also failed to
flush the problem at the certiorari stage." Thus "both this Court and
the attorney appointed by the Court to represent petitioner here have
unwittingly been placed in the unfortunate posture of addressing a
situation that does not exist."' ' To decide upon what was now a
"purely artificial and hypothetical issue" would mean the justices
were "lending [them]selves to an unjustifiable intrusion upon the time
of this Court" - which it would be fair to say they felt had already
occurred.
If lawyers at times fail to keep the Court abreast of important
developments, there are instances when the Court's own timing makes
it necessary for lawyers to address new matters only after argument.
In one case, in which a jurisdictional question had not been raised
prior to OA, on the day of argument the Court handed down a case
that posed the issue. On the basis of that case, "it was suggested
from the bench that supplemental briefs addressed to the issue of
jurisdiction ...
98.
99.
100.
101.
Gonzalez

in light of Gonzalez be submitted."'' ° A vacate-and-

Id. at 239-40 (emphasis in original).
Conway v. California Adult Auth., 396 U.S. 107, 109-10 (1969).
Id. at 110.
MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U.S. 799, 801 n.6 (1975). The earlier case was
v. Employees Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90 (1974).
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remand disposition, for entry of a new order and a new appeal, was
the result.
An interesting instance of the Court's learning of dispositive
material after the granting of review because attorneys were attentive
to the Court's other, related actions and provided material made
relevant by those actions came in the Moon case (discussed earlier).
During the state's argument, Assistant Attorney General Edward F.
Borgerding was asked whether the trial judge's affidavit (indicating
reasons for higher sentence at retrial) was "available in the files when
petition for the writ was filed here or when it was granted." After
answering, "It was after it was granted," Borgerding noted that
certiorari was granted the day that the Court decided Pearceand that
he had requested inclusion of the affidavit to meet what he called the
Court's "directive" to brief the retroactivity of Pearce after having
read Pearce: "I thought it would be best that the Court had that
information." 0 2
What is crucial, as the above suggestion may indicate, is the
timing of the Court's knowledge of key facts relevant to a case. The
Court may, of course, learn of key matters even before the reviewgranting or denying stage. Thus, in Iron Arrow Honor Society v.
Heckler,031 the Secretary of Health and Human Services, who argued
that a letter from the university president made the case moot, had
also argued this to the Fifth Circuit; without argument, and discussing
the law of mootness, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded.' 4 In
DeFunis, the first serious challenge to affirmative action programs to
reach the Supreme Court, the Court asked for briefing on mootness
before acting on the petition for certiorari. Perhaps because both
sides said the case was not moot, the Court proceeded with argument
but, with the issue having been raised, it was perhaps not surprising
that mootness was the Court's reason for not reaching the merits.
Further passage of time had provided confirmatory evidence. In its
per curiam the Court noted, "In response to questions raised from
the bench during oral argument, counsel for the petitioner has informed the Court that Defunis has now registered for his final quarter
in law school." 0
At the other extreme, the Court may not learn of key matters
which provide the basis for a nonmerits disposition until after argu102. Moon v. Maryland, 398 U.S. 319 (1970) (Transcript of Oral Argument at

33-34).
103. 464 U.S. 67 (1983).

104. Id.
105. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 315-316 (1974).
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ment, a situation in which the parties' attorneys are often not to
blame. Thus, in Speight v. Slaton,' °6 an obscenity case raising the
issue of whether a federal court should rule with state proceedings
pending, the Supreme Court learned, "[s]ince oral argument of this
case," 0 7 of a state court decision striking application of the law in
like circumstances. Because the state court could provide relief on the
basis of the intervening ruling, a federal court injunction would be
unnecessary, so the Court vacated and remanded. Likewise, after the
California Supreme Court invalidated that state's death penalty under
the state constitution, and a suggestion of mootness was filed after
argument, the justices dismissed the pending federal constitutional
challenge as improvidently granted because moot. 10 8
If the Court learns of changes in a case after granting review but
before argument, it is possible to have a disposition without argument.
We see this in Odom v. United States,'0 9 another case testing the
possible retroactivity of North Carolina v. Pearce. Here the Supreme
Court was able to DIG the case before argument because it had
learned of an order which "makes it clear that the greater severity of
the second sentence was based on conduct ... occurring after the
time of the original sentencing proceeding, and that the new information was specifically referred to at resentencing." As a result, "it
is now apparent that this case does not present the issue" for which
it had been accepted." 0
We also see it in United States Department of Justice v. Provenzano,"' which, when filed, posed the question of whether a statute
fell within an exception to the Freedom of Information Act. Because
the "parties now advise us" of a new statute amending the Privacy
Act and thus affecting the FOIA exception, the issue for which
certiorari was granted was mooted, so the Court, without argument,
vacated and remanded for further proceedings. 1 2 Likewise, a concession of error by the government can also allow a nonmerits disposition
before argument, as when the Court vacated the lower court ruling
in Torres Valencia v. United States,"3 and remanded for further
consideration of the concession.
106. 415 U.S. 333 (1974).
107. Id. at 334.

108. Aikens v. California, 406 U.S. 813, 814 (1972).
109. 400 U.S. 23 (1970).
110. Id.

111. 469 U.S. 14 (1984).
112. Id. at 14-15.
113. 464 U.S. 44 (1983).
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That the Court has matters brought to its attention in a timely
fashion does not mean the Court promptly absorbs the new information. Information may be evident in the briefs but may not be
discovered until shortly before the scheduled date of argument - the
point at which the justices read or review the briefs. If something
significant were discovered at that point, it might be easier for the
Court to proceed with argument than to cancel it, particularly if the
case contained more than one issue. With the parties and the justices
having invested time in the case, proceeding may be better than
aborting argument, an action that would probably require some
written disposition to be prepared under a short lead time.
Justice Stevens has said that "sound principles of judicial economy" would be served by proceeding with argument even when
examination of the briefs reveals differences from what was evident
in the certiorari petition."1 4 Although he has not used the terms
''momentum" or "inertia," Justice Stevens implicitly suggests their
role when he also writes that in some cases where briefing and
argument reveal changed circumstances, the justices will "nevertheless
proceed to decide the case on the merits because there is no strong
countervailing reason to dismiss after the large investment of resources
by the parties and the Court.""' 5 What he does not mention is that
the Court's audiences - lawyers and "court-watchers" - will be
highly critical should the Court, once having granted review use DIG
dispositions frequently, particularly when it may appear that the Court
has avoided coming to grips with an important issue.
We do find that when the Court learns of matters in timely
fashion, oral argument will not necessarily be dispensed with nor a
nonmerits ruling avoided. An example is Patterson v. Warner,"6
challenging the requirement of a double bond for an appeal from a
justice of the peace court.1 7 Well before the time for Supreme Court
argument - indeed, "[s]hortly prior to the filing of briefs in this
Court" - the state supreme court ruled, in another case, against the
validity of the J.P. courts. The matter of mootness was brought to
the Court's attention by appellant, although interestingly the issue
was not briefed. Thus the justices were aware of the state's ruling.
Perhaps because the appellee state had. opposed the suggestion of
mootness, the Supreme Court proceeded with argument. There ap-

114.
115.
116.
117.

New York v. Uplinger, 467 U.S. 246, 250 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 251 (Stevens, J., concurring).
415 U.S. 303 (1974).
Id. at 304.
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pellant, despite his earlier suggestion of mootness, argued that the
state court ruling was not applicable to this case, which thus remained
alive; the state, also reversing course, argued for full retroactivity of
the state court ruling. It is not surprising that in this situation the
Supreme Court did not reach the merits but instead vacated the ruling
and remanded the case so the lower court could evaluate the effect
of the intervening state ruling.
As noted earlier, the information revealed to the Court does not
always point the justices in a single direction. Two cases from the
1970s illustrate further the disagreement that can be generated among
the justices as to whether a nonmerits disposition should be issued
and as to whether information newly available to the Court provides
a proper basis for it. One case reached the Court containing the issue
of whether disability benefits could be terminated without a hearing,
the Court earlier having ruled that welfare benefit terminations required a hearing. The majority, saying, "Shortly before oral argument, we were advised that the Secretary had adopted new regulations,"
vacated and remanded the case to allow determinations to be reprocessed under the new regulations. " 8 Justice Douglas, however, argued
that, with the Court having heard oral argument based on the issue
of whether there was a difference between welfare and disability
payments with respect to due process requirements, the question would
"remain regardless of the outcome of a remand" and thus should be
decided." 9 Douglas also joined a separate opinion by Justice Brennan,
who felt the Court's failure to deal with the constitutional question
was "inappropriate, indeed irresponsible." "Moreover," said Justice
Brennan, "the question has been thoroughly and ably argued and
briefed on both sides," so the Court20 had before it the material
necessary for a resolution of the issue.
Three years later, having granted review to the Indianapolis
school desegregation case, the majority vacated and remanded the
lower court ruling to be dismissed as moot because, as the per curiam
noted, "[A]t oral argument, we were informed by counsel for petitioners [the school board] that all of the named plaintiffs . . . had
graduated from the Indianapolis school system.' ' 2' Perhaps that fact
would provide an adequate basis for a mootness ruling. However,
Justice Douglas, dissenting, pointed out at oral argument the same
118. Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208, 209 (1972).
119. Id. at 211 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

120. Id. at 212 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

121. Board of School Comm'rs of Indianapolis v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128, 129
(1975).
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lawyer also "stated, in response to a question from us, that there had
been a declaration of certification of class action,' ' 2 2 which a conservative majority had used in other situations to reach the merits (and
a conservative result). Perhaps here one sees again a strategic use of
a nonmerits disposition: the Court may have been looking for a "way
out" of deciding this major northern school case.
CONCLUSION

Drawing data from the Supreme Court Judicial Data Base, we
have examined aspects of the relationship between the Supreme Court's
per curiam dispositions and oral argument, particularly for O.T. 19691981. We find that the volume of p.c.'s has changed over time downward over the period of our study. This decrease is true for
p.c.'s handed down after oral argument, when the Court most often
uses a procedural disposition (either dismissing or vacating and remanding), as well as for those issued without argument. The ratio of
OA to NOA per curiams - there usually are more of the latter has varied. As the number of per curiam dispositions has declined,
the number of signed opinions has not increased correspondingly, so
p.c.'s become a lower proportion of the Court's dispositions and OA
p.c.'s also become a lower proportion of argued cases.
Our concern in this paper has been whether some per curiam
dispositions after oral argument are part of the Court's process of
reaching intelligent, informed decisions and avoiding rulings based on
faulty information about the facts, including the procedural posture,
of cases, as well as engaging in the narrowing of issues that is part
of issue fluidity. The Court's per curiam opinions provide clear
evidence that oral argument at times - but certainly not always has been directly relevant to the Court's disposition of a case - and
at times determinative of the outcome. That evidence is reinforced and in some cases increased - when OA transcript is read against
the per curiam, because we find concessions by counsel that reveal
important changes in case posture that lead directly to nonmerits
dispositions.
Not only does the Court's use of per curiam nonmerits dispositions implicate the Rule of Four - the conditions under which the
Court accepts cases and then reaches (or does not reach) the merits
122. Id. at 132 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 11). Douglas also said
that the Court should not accept as adequate assurance the statement by counsel that
one of the school board's discriminatory boundaries "is no longer in existence." Id.
at 133 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, 5).
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- but it also raises questions as to whether lawyers have properly
informed the Court of key developments in their cases, particularly
(but not only) those occurring after the Court's grant of review. In
some instances it is clear that lawyers have been lax; in others, the
Court knows of changes in case posture but proceeds with oral
argument nonetheless, perhaps because of effort already expended on
the case. Here as more generally, possession of information does not
mean the justices agree on the action the Court should take - an
indication of varying views on cases and on the use, strategic or
otherwise, of per curiam dispositions.
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